Abstract: In 1930 Germany's vast and diverse network of agricultural cooperatives was unified in the world's largest cooperative organization. Unification was underwritten by the state in support of an agrarian sector in deep crisis. It was achieved under the banner of rationalization, the elimination of wasteful duplication of rural cooperatives. The focus of this article is how the Raiffeisen General Association, Germany's second-largest cooperative organization, exploited state interest in cooperative merger and the contemporary mantra of rationalization to leverage public aid to overcome a financial crisis in its central credit union, the Raiffeisen Bank. While asserting cooperative principles of mutual assistance and self-help, Raiffeisen pursued unification as a means to state rescue. It thereby re-framed the relationship between self-help and state aid that has been a central theme of scholarship on the German cooperative movement.
which provided oversight and substantial injections of public funding to see it achieved. Raiffeissen's rescue through cooperative merger was thus linked to broader governmental initiatives to support Germany's agricultural sector. The story of Weimar-era Raiffeissen provides a useful case study in how a financial institution rooted in a movement built on mutual assistance and self-help made rationalization the basis for negotiating a publicly funded bailout.
Prior to unification in 1930 approximately eighty-five percent of German agricultural cooperatives belonged to one of the two main national organizations. The older of these was founded by Wilhelm Raiffeisen in the Rhineland in the 1860s to provide credit to small farmers. Raiffeisen's General Association, by the mid-1920s comprising roughly 8,600 cooperative societies, championed conservative Christian values. Organizationally it was distinguished by its centralized structure, notably by its central cooperative bank located in Berlin, but it also claimed uniqueness as the embodiment of specific ethical and spiritual principles -unity, loyalty and Christian charity. Its much larger counterpart, the National Association of German Agricultural Cooperatives, or Reichsverband, was a breakaway group founded by Wilhelm Haas in the 1880s that quickly outstripped Raiffeisen. By 1926 it encompassed almost 26,000 cooperatives. Over against Raiffeisen's emphasis on ethical principles and Christian charity, Haas's organization was secular and more liberal in orientation and encouraged diverse and specialized forms of rural cooperation. It also adopted a decentralized structure. The Reichsverband's central savings and loan offices were regional rather than national, and its local associations enjoyed greater autonomy. 5 For a brief period before the Great War the General Association and the Reichsverband formed a working partnership. Otherwise they were competitors in the many regions of the country where their organizations overlapped. 6
I.
The relationship between cooperative self-help and the state is a central theme in historical treatment of the German cooperative movement in the 5 On Raiffeisen's spiritual values and distinctiveness from the Reichsverband cf. Fairbairn, ''History from the Ecological Perspective, '' 1220 , 1229 David Peal, ''Rural Cooperatives in Imperial Germany,'' Central European History 21.3 (1988) : 244-66, here 262-63. Grü nfeld, Das Genossenschaftswesen, 238, describes the Raiffeisen ethos as Christian, conservative, and authoritarian. 6
Grü nfeld, Das Genossenschaftswesen, 249-52.
thomas j. saundersimperial period. 7 Although cooperatives by definition assumed an independent socio-economic role, their rapid growth inevitably brought intersection with public officials and spawned debate about how they should position themselves vis-à-vis the state. The remarkable expansion of networks of credit and consumer cooperatives in the late nineteenth century, and their growing economic and political significance in rural Germany, drew official attention and concern, which prompted a mix of state regulation and assistance. 8 Outstanding among state initiatives was Prussia's founding in 1895 of the Prussian Central Cooperative Bank, known as the Preussenkasse, to facilitate the loan operations of credit unions. A publicly financed institution, the Preussenkasse ostensibly served the principle of cooperative self-help. Its founders foresaw its eventual takeover by the cooperative associations. Yet the Preussenkasse, which was accountable to the Prussian Minister of Finance, also represented the arm of the state and drew conflicting responses from the main cooperative groups. 9 The Reichsverband, whose decentralized structure made access to funds via the Preussenkasse particularly opportune, embraced this state initiative. By contrast, Raiffeisen initially viewed the creation of a state bank with some unease, not least because it maintained a central bank of its own. 10 Yet after the turn of the century Raiffeisen looked increasingly to the Preussenkasse for assistance, particularly in 1905 when, critically in debt, it accepted aid for what proved a temporary merger with the Klaus Kluthe, Genossenschaften und Staat in Deutschland (Berlin, 1985) , 82-83. 9 See the introduction by Gerald Braunberger in Guinnane et al., Die Geschichte der DZ BANK, [18] [19] [20] Guinnane, ''State Support,'' 219-27; Fairbairn, ''History from the Ecological Perspective, '' 1223 , 1232 Peal, ''Rural Cooperatives in Imperial Germany,'' 250-52; Kluthe, Genossenschaften und Staat, 84-86; Faust, Geschichte der Genossenschaftsbewegung (Frankfurt, 1965) , 407-13; Christoph Schlosser, Die Entwicklung genossenschaftlicher Zentralbankstrukturen und -funktionen aus institutionö-konomischer Sicht (Hamburg, 2008) , 95-101. Reichsverband. 11 Less than a decade later Raiffeisen terminated its agreements with the Preussenkasse and the Reichsverband and reasserted its independence. However, in the postwar period the Preussenkasse became the Raiffeisen Bank 's principal source of operating credit. The relationship of the Preussenkasse and German cooperatives as a whole also underwent an important shift as revisions to the former's statutes permitted the cooperative organizations to acquire shares and a voice in the Preussenkasse. For Raiffeisen, as for the Reichsverband, the Preussenkasse became a vital partner in navigating the massive economic challenges of the postwar decade. 12 In the late 1920s it also played a pivotal role in the unification of the cooperative sector, a union resulting in formation, under a hyphenated name, of the world's largest single cooperative organization: National Association of German Agricultural Cooperatives -Raiffeisen. Cooperative unification was a lengthy and contentious process, encouraged and ultimately mediated by public authorities and made possible thanks to funds from Prussia and the Reich. The limited scholarly interest in this development has centred on the role of the state, above all that of the Preussenkasse, in the final stage of the process. 13 This essay examines the early and middle phases of unification that have been largely neglected. Specific focus is on how the Raiffeisen General Association, contrary to its proud tradition of independence, pursued a merger with the Reichsverband in order to leverage public funding to overcome a mid-decade financial crisis in its central bank; a crisis that threatened to undermine its extensive network of agricultural credit unions. The aim is to demonstrate how Raiffeisen, under great duress, adopted the contemporary watchword of rationalization to justify surrender of its independence and to solicit help from the state. 
II.
Rationalization was a mantra of Weimar economic development, applied in multiple ways across a variety of sectors. Streamlining of production processes -scientific management or ''Taylorism'' -to eliminate wasteful duplication, and the introduction of economies of scale and improved efficiency to enhance profitability, represented one of its aspects. Business concentration, including vertical and horizontal integration, represented another. With an eye on American industrial achievements and market strategies, German businesses viewed concentration as essential to international competitiveness. 14 Although rationalization is most frequently associated with the business and marketing strategies just noted, it became a slogan of enormous plasticity. The speaker in the Reichstag quoted at the beginning of this essay used rationalization to frame her discussion of household management. In the context of cooperative union, rationalization referred principally to elimination of duplication of structures and services provided by Raiffeisen and the Reichsverband. Without denying the potential benefits of competition, rationalization connoted integration of the organizational apparatus of German cooperative associations to enhance their efficiency. At the same time that rationalization and efficiency became economic mantras, the private sector received unprecedented levels of state subventions and loans. Compensation to industry in the Ruhr for losses incurred through the policy of passive resistance against French and Belgian occupiers in 1923, and massive assistance to agriculture that culminated in ''eastern aid'' (Osthilfe) during the depression, are the most familiar of a host of such provisions of public aid. 15 Although the private sector resisted the command economy and state interference in wage settlements, it looked to the state for economic rescue and redress. Politics increasingly In the context of cooperative union, rationalization referred principally to elimination of duplication of structures and services provided by Raiffeisen and the Reichsverband.
became a clamour of claims on the public purse. Agricultural producers' demands were particularly successful in this regard, ultimately receiving the largest share of public subventions. 16 The sector in which German credit unions predominated -roughly one in two farmers belonged to some kind of cooperative society -had a long history of state intervention and assistance. From the late nineteenth century tariff protection was crucial for sustaining agriculture in an era of growing international competition and relative decline in the national economy. 17 The competing priorities of the wartime command economy, including production and marketing quotas, raised unprecedented challenges for the sector and provoked deep resentment of state regulation. Shortages of manpower, horsepower, and fertilizers resulted in rising costs, falling output, and sharp discontent. Postwar inflation and dismantling of the controlled economy allowed agrarian producers to eliminate indebtedness, yet stabilization of the currency and the revival of tariff protection did not compensate for higher interest rates and labour costs in an era of declining international prices. German farmers quickly accumulated high levels of debt and continued to see their position decline relative to industry. Broad political sympathy and substantial public subventions did not address the structural problems of agriculture. Even before the onset of the Great Depression much of the sector was in crisis. 18 Within this wider economic context, the difficulties encountered by the Raiffeisen Bank in the transition from hyperinflation to a stable currency were both part of broader trends and a specific outcome of ill-advised policy. Like other lenders, the bank saw its assets decimated during the inflation as operating costs rose sharply and borrowers paid off loans in the depreciated currency. The Raiffeisen Bank became increasingly dependent on the Preussenkasse to provide funds for its regular credit operations. It also attempted to offset loss of revenue by investing, against its mandate and past practice, outside the cooperative sector. The outcome was catastrophic. In the aftermath of the inflation, misguided investments in private enterprises, and efforts to rescue looming losses with further high-risk loans, The Raiffeisen Bank could not altogether conceal its losses, but it withheld details of the misplaced investments out of justified fear that they would provoke public outrage. For an organization devoted to mutual assistance in agriculture and boasting lofty ethical principles, loans that later prompted legal and parliamentary investigations for bribery and breach of trust presented the risk of scandal and financial collapse. 20 To avoid panic among Raiffeisen's membership the bank 's leadership imposed strict confidentiality on discussions of the failed investments. Behind closed doors it acknowledged that Raiffeisen faced ruin. Amid efforts to limit public fallout and internal deliberations on how to stave off collapse, Raiffeisen appealed to the Preussenkasse for emergency credit. Once this was secured it made overtures to the Reichsverband for cooperative merger. The aim was to acquire a partner to assist in absorbing its losses and to strengthen the case for state aid by pursuing cooperative rationalization.
III.
The idea of revisiting a merger with the Reichsverband, floated by one of Raiffeisen's regional directors in October 1925, was initially judged as premature. Not needing to publish an annual statement until mid-1926, Raiffeisen focused on securing a bridging loan from the Preussenkasse and on internal restructuring, including replacement of the three executive A subscription campaign for the pledges proved a notable success: over eighty percent of the required sum was generated in six weeks. 22 At the annual general congress in June 1926 Raiffeisen leaders celebrated the outcome of the subscription campaign as a brilliant vindication of the principle of self-help and the strength of Raiffeisen's ideals of unity and self-sacrifice, an achievement on which future generations would look back with admiration and pride. 23 But in camera they struggled with the deepening realization that the bridging loan was at best a stopgap. As internal estimates of losses from dubious investments continued to rise, they recognized that the loan improved the bank 's bargaining position but did not resolve its future. Amortization of the losses, if possible at all, would be a burden into the next generation. In April the executive committee and directors had ruled out bankruptcy as too damaging to Raiffeisen members and to the cooperative sector in general and had recognized the need for assistance to shoulder the bank 's losses. 24 Since any partner needed deep and sympathetic pockets, the alternatives quickly narrowed to the Preussenkasse or the Reichsverband backed by the Preussenkasse. The crucial drawback of merger with the former was state control and parliamentary oversight. The central risk with the latter was that Raiffeisen would be swallowed up by an organization roughly three times its size. Antipathy to state control, particularly that of Prussia under a socialist-led Weimar coalition, made merger with the Reichsverband the lesser evil. 25 Magnus von Braun approached this option by playing the traditions and spiritual values of the Raiffeisen movement against fiscal and political realities. By background an East Prussian estate holder, Braun was initially judged an unlikely candidate to lead the organization. 26 Although familiar with rural cooperatives from his position as a Landrat in imperial Germany, he was a newcomer to the movement, having been appointed a regional director only in 1921. However, Braun boasted other kinds of invaluable experience. He had navigated the complexities of public and private interests as an aide both before and during the war to the state secretary in the Ministry of the Interior, Clemens Delbrü ck. In the final year of the war he also served as Reich press chief. He therefore had expertise at the highest level in both the politics of administration and public relations. In the Weimar period he was to serve on the advisory board of the Preussenkasse, the administrative council of the National Credit Institute or rka (the federal public loan agency for German agriculture), and the executive committee of the Reichsbank. His administrative and ideological credentials later earned him the post of Minister of Agriculture in Franz von Papen's 'cabinet of barons' and Kurt von Schleicher's brief interlude prior to Hitler's chancellorship. 27 A conservative aristocrat steeped in the values of the agrarian east, Braun viewed the Weimar Republic, and democracy in general, as a misguided experiment. Yet he was also a realist and Realpolitiker, with a capacity to weigh alternatives in the crisis of 1926 that distinguished him from many of those on his board, half of whom were clergy. As a newcomer he was not encumbered by their spiritual and deep-seated attachment to Raiffeisen traditions. 28 Already in 1924, thus before the financial debacle, he had explored regional merger with counterparts in the Reichsverband. 29 As general director of Raiffeisen he employed the requisite language, applauding the Raiffeisen spirit and the principle of self-help, and professing commitment to long-term recovery that would preserve an independent future. But recognizing the negligible hope of long-term recovery, and sympathetic to consolidation of rural cooperatives, he pursued an entirely different solution to Raiffeisen's woes. He did this not behind his colleagues' backs but in parallel with efforts to save the organization, efforts he recognized had almost no prospect of success. Drawing on his experience and political connections, and taking advantage of competition between Prussia and the Reich for influence in the cooperative sector, he 26 There were significant reservations about his suitability and his acceptability to Raiffeisen's Rhenish heartland: BArch R 8087/99, 68-77. 27
Braun's Weg durch vier Zeitepochen, a blend of autobiography and ideological reflections, traces the main stages of his career and his political connections but offers limited insight into his role at Raiffeisen. Cf. Faust, Geschichte der Genossenschaftsbewegung, 312-13. 28
Braun, Weg durch vier Zeitepochen, 76, 206. 29 Ibid., launched Raiffeisen on the road to merger with the Reichsverband, a road he aimed to pave with aid from the public purse. A full account of the process of unification, and of the competing interests within and beyond Raiffeisen that contributed to its outcome, is beyond the space available here. Attention will focus on Raiffeisen's strategy for using unification as the basis for offloading its debt to the public purse. Rationalization -unification of the cooperative movement -was a tactic, masquerading as the strategic goal. By assigning primacy to consolidation of Germany's cooperative sector rather than to financial rescue, Braun positioned Raiffeisen to draw on the resources not only of the Preussenkasse but also of the Reich and its agricultural bank, the National Credit Institute (rka). The two fundamental arguments for union Braun presented to the Reichsverband in his lengthy formal overture of October 1926 were calculated to appeal to state authorities and thus leverage funding to overcome Raiffeisen's financial crisis. The first was elimination of costly and inefficient organizational overlap at the national, regional, and local levels. The second was to give the German cooperative movement public and economic influence commensurate with its overall numbers and importance. Both arguments underwrote bilateral talks but they were crucial to anchor appeals to the state by promising benefit to the troubled agricultural economy. 30
IV.
The economic and political context for Braun's two-pronged rationale was broadly favourable. The agrarian sector as a whole represented a vital and long-standing national interest. Loss of arable land and the separation of agrarian East Prussia from the rest of Germany by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles made support for the sector a partisan issue only in terms of how it was organized and distributed. In the face of international competition and high agrarian indebtedness, the state initiated wide-ranging assistance programs even before the Great Depression to address what was 30 BArch R 8087/61, 90-105. In his Weg durch vier Zeitepochen, 187-88, Braun treats the rescue operation for Raiffeisen and rationalization of cooperatives as separate developments.
Rationalization -unification of the cooperative movement -was a tactic, masquerading as the strategic goal. By assigning primacy to consolidation of Germany's cooperative sector rather than to financial rescue, Braun positioned Raiffeisen to draw on the resources not only of the Preussenkasse but also of the Reich and its agricultural bank, the National Credit Institute (rka).
perceived as a fundamental crisis of the agrarian economy. 31 In addition, there was long-standing sympathy for the project of overcoming the divisions, duplication, and inefficiencies of German cooperatives, a project that appeared to offer one solution to the challenges facing the agrarian economy in the postwar decade. 32 Insofar as aid to agricultural cooperatives represented, or could be framed as being in the interest of the agrarian sector as a whole, it could expect a sympathetic hearing. 33 Beginning with Braun's memorandum to the Reichsverband in October 1926, Raiffeisen cultivated the attention and support of the relevant authorities, including members of the respective parliaments of Prussia and the Reich. Its proposal to the Reichsverband was copied to key public figures, among them the president of the Preussenkasse, Carl Semper, the Prussian and Reich Ministers of Agriculture, the Reich Economics Minister, and the president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht. Noteworthy here is that although the proposal itself referred to union or fusion, the covering letter to these other recipients systematically highlighted the necessity and benefits, for the agricultural sector and the national economy, of rationalizing cooperatives. Braun played to the prevailing assumption that rationalization was inherently beneficial, an assumption he understood that state bodies could exploit in turn to propose and justify subventions. His claim of benefits for the national economy was predicated on the large proportion of the German population represented or assisted by the cooperative movement. It functioned thanks to its premise about rationalization, a premise that became the rhetorical leitmotif and platform for appeals for aid. 34 The broad arguments advanced in support of cooperative rationalization dovetailed neatly with the Preussenkasse's mandate to support the cooperative sector, evidenced in provision of the emergency bridging loan. As Raiffeisen's only significant creditor, the Preussenkasse also had a concrete interest in Raiffeisen's wellbeing. With sums well in excess of the bridging loan tied up in Raiffeisen's regular credit operations, it had a strong incentive to safeguard that commitment. 35 To these two considerations must be added a third. The Preussenkasse was itself perilously indebted to the Reichsbank and faced sharp political scrutiny in Prussia and the Reich for its lending policies. The Reich was also applying pressure to transform it into a national institution. To protect its leading role in the cooperative sector the Preussenkasse needed to set its own financial house in order, a task that included resolving Raiffeisen's troubled status. 36 Braun read all these circumstances astutely. In principle he held very weak cards: Raiffeisen's financial desperation undercut its bargaining position. Yet he made the most of his limited room to maneuver by taking the initiative. He proposed union with the Reichsverband and developed a plan for state funding to spare the Preussenkasse the financial and political embarrassment of Raiffeisen's collapse that won support from conservative politicians in the Reich, notably Schacht and the Minister of Food and Agriculture, Martin Schiele. In the complex and protracted negotiations to achieve union backed by state funding he displayed considerable political acumen and a hard nose. The challenge was multifaceted. He faced significant resistance from within his own organization. Vis-à-vis the Reichsverband, fundamental differences of understanding and approach, as well as a lengthy competitive history needed to be overcome. Finally, cooperative merger required reconciling the interests of the Preussenkasse with the national authorities willing to help fund it.
Within the Raiffeisen organization and across its regional associations, cooperative unification met with divided and ambivalent responses, not to mention recurring bouts of denial and wishful thinking. 37 In the confidence of board meetings Raiffeisen's sudden interest in revisiting cooperative merger was acknowledged as opportunistic: without the financial crisis it would not have been a priority. Moreover, had the emergency package of 40 million marks from the Preussenkasse resolved Raiffeisen's problems, the idea of cooperative merger would have died a natural death. It was with a sense of fatalism more than enthusiasm -reserved for pronouncements to sell the plan to members and its prospective partners -that V.
Negotiations with the Reichsverband began tentatively and proceeded fitfully. Aside from resolving Raiffeisen's financial status, the main prerequisite for merging the two largest cooperative organizations was to reconcile the disparities in size, structure, and traditions of Raiffeisen and the Reichsverband. The principal incompatibility was between the decentralized structure of the Reichsverband, specifically in banking and credit, and the centralized organization of Raiffeisen embodied in the Raiffeisen Bank. The Reichsverband's response to Braun's memorandum of October 1926 inviting consideration of merger fully endorsed the goal and even raised the possibility of shared responsibility for Raiffeisen's debts. But it disagreed fundamentally with the approach Braun outlined. Braun proposed that merger begin at the top, creating a new directorial body based on parity in principle and on representation according to membership numbers in practice. In the only reference in the memorandum to the debts and amortization plan to rescue the Raiffeisen Bank, he indicated that in a united organization the former Raiffeisen cooperatives would retain liability and the bank would continue to function. 40 The response from the Reichsverband argued that Raiffeisen's centralization was the proximate source of its troubled financial history. It disagreed that once fusion took place Raiffeisen could preserve the Raiffeisen Bank and amortize its debts. Any merger would need to address the debt problem with complete transparency. Moreover, fusion of central offices would not yield a true merger. The Reichsverband insisted that fusion begin regionally, that is at the level of its organizational focus. 41 After a preliminary meeting of representatives from both sides in January 1927, Raiffeisen prepared a draft proposal for merger in March that conceded both points. Fusion would result in a new central cooperative institution but would proceed at the regional level, transforming branches of the Raiffeisen Bank into autonomous credit unions or merging them with the corresponding Reichsverband credit institutions. Yet despite agreement in principle and a working platform, negotiations stretched into 1929. The long road to unity can be explained in part by the practical challenges of fusing organizations built on similar principles but dissimilar structures and traditions. 42 But more significant sources of the length and complexity of the process were Raiffeisen's hesitations and its schemes to enhance its bargaining position by masking its financial problems (not least by politicizing them), disagreements over how to pitch the case for state assistance, and the competing interests of Prussia and the Reich in providing aid.
Already in the draft program and a lengthy addendum Raiffeisen broached political issues not in the initial exchange of notes by addressing the role and responsibilities of the Preussenkasse. Raiffeisen understood its agreement to decentralize and dissolve its own bank as a concession to the Preussenkasse as well as to the Reichsverband. For this it demanded ''ideal and material'' compensation. 43 The Preussenkasse, which in any case no longer confined its operations to Prussia, was to be formally recast as a Reich institution and the united cooperative movement was to acquire majority representation on its supervisory board. Prussia was to lose its commanding voice. The Raiffeisen Bank would operate in the short-term to realize whatever could be extracted from the collateral against its misguided investments. Raiffeisen's regional associations would accept responsibility for the bank 's debts, but the Preussenkasse was to forego interest on its loan and forgive at least a portion of the principal. 44 As these terms suggest, Braun did not wait for cooperative merger to exercise the wider public and economic clout that fusion promised. How aggressively he was prepared to exploit the prospect of merger, and apply pressure on the Preussenkasse, is apparent in a simultaneous approach to a financial institution of the Reich, the National Credit Institute (rka). The rka was the successor to the German Rentenbank that had been created to underwrite the interim currency, the Rentenmark, after the hyperinflation. With the adoption of the Reichsmark in 1924 the Rentenbank 's formal task was fulfilled. In 1925 its assets were assumed by the rka, whose mandate was to channel funds from the Reichsbank to German agriculture via regular lending institutions, much as the Preussenkasse serviced cooperative associations. As a member of the rka's executive council, Braun prepared a wide-ranging prospectus in April 1927 on credit for German agriculture whose aim was to justify state aid, a document he had privately vetted and approved by Reichsbank president Schacht. 45 Three elements of the prospectus are significant here. The first is that Braun's strategic and political vision went far beyond the technicalities or financial requirements of unifying German cooperatives. He couched this task within the overarching goal of enhancing the performance and profitability of the German agrarian economy. The second is that prominent among the tasks he assigned to the rka was assistance to cooperatives mired in debt or short of credit, thus spotlighting the convergence, and potential competition, of its role with that of the Preussenkasse. Third, although happy to use his position on the executive council to advance proposals designed to benefit the cooperative organization he represented, he avoided reference to Raiffeisen's circumstances. His funding model referred generically to cooperative credit institutions that had suffered losses and whose debt burden prevented positive contributions to German agriculture. 46 Raiffeisen's financial plight was implicitly just one of many challenges facing the sector. Moreover, the funding proposal was so expansive that there was no obvious tie to the Raiffeisen Bank 's predicament.
Posing as the spokesperson of the German cooperative movement and German agriculture, Braun proposed that the rka provide the Preussenkasse 150 million marks over ten years without interest for distribution to the cooperatives to rebuild their ailing associations. 47 His rationale for such aid elided the massive debts of the Raiffeisen Bank. He claimed that by facilitating cooperative merger the rka's financial contribution would shore up the deeply indebted Preussenkasse. Collaboration between the rka and the Preussenkasse would create ''a powerful instrument of self-help in German agriculture'' -an understanding of self-help that presumed massive state aid. 48 He did not specify how the figure of 150 million marks 
VI.
If the watchword under which merger paraded, rationalization, was selfconsciously the watchword of the age, Sanierung was, at least in this context, its negative counterpart. Rationalization stood for efficiencies of scale and higher productivity to improve competitiveness. Sanierung connoted, by contrast, rescue of what was mired in debt, badly structured or poorly managed -a bailout or salvage operation. The former promised to reward investment; the latter raised awkward questions about the management and viability of the Raiffeisen Bank. Braun's principal challenge lay in presenting Raiffeisen's financial position as manageable on the basis of self-help -to pacify his own membership and negotiate from a position of strength with the Reichsverband and the Preussenkasse -and at the same time to appeal for public monies to cover the dramatic losses, i.e. Sanierung. From the beginning of negotiations for merger in early 1927, the Reichsverband flatly refused to be party to joint requests for state aid that included funds for bailout. It explicitly contrasted funds required for Sanierung and those required for rationalization. Its position reminded Raiffeisen negotiators that they represented an organization whose financial status, unlike their own, was imperilled. It also respected, as Raiffeisen recognized, that the public purse favoured viable operations. The Preussenkasse, facing a deep financial crisis of its own, closely tied to its very large engagement in Raiffeisen, was similarly adamant that it would not advance 49 Barmeyer, Andreas Hermes, 133-34.
Rationalization stood for efficiencies of scale and higher productivity to improve competitiveness. Sanierung connoted, by contrast, rescue of what was mired in debt, badly structured or poorly managed -a bailout or salvage operation.
funds for Sanierung as opposed to rationalization. The Raiffeisen Bank needed to be liquidated, not salvaged. 50 Braun could not deny the losses incurred by the Raiffeisen Bank, but he took the position, thanks to the bridging loan, that these were debts like any other that would be repaid over time from the bank 's operating profits. For bargaining purposes he insisted that Raiffeisen's financial house was in order and repeatedly asserted that Raiffeisen would honour the ideal of self-help and pay off its debts from within its own societies. But he also aimed to off-load debt to the public purse. His strategy required some skilful trimming, not least to overcome opposition to credits for Sanierung. To his colleagues he praised self-help while presenting fusion underwritten by the state as the realistic road to rescue; to Reichsverband negotiators he baldly denied his bank 's financial peril or that fusion was about addressing Raiffeisen's losses. 51 Braun's strategy was articulated in a highly confidential circular to Raiffeisen's regional directors in mid-1927. With confirmation of rka approval in principle of extensive long-term credit to support cooperative rationalization, Braun explained his political calculations. The key national bodies, the rka and the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, supported his bold funding proposal. The Preussenkasse, with the Prussian Ministry of Finance, resisted it, since it threatened Reich inroads into their prerogatives, though the Preussenkasse could hardly pretend disinterest in the funds it promised from the rka. Braun boasted that he had rebuffed objections from the Preussenkasse to how he had taken advantage of his position with the rka to pursue cheap credit to offset Raiffeisen's losses. He had even proposed the unlikely fusion of the Preussenkasse with the rka in order to remove the former from (Prussian) state control. 52 Moreover, he had informed president Semper of the Preussenkasse that as long as credit was cheap it was immaterial to him what language served to justify it: if the term Sanierung raised objections, Braun advised Semper to find a substitute he preferred. 53 In both substance and tone Braun's strategy bordered on holding the Preussenkasse a political and financial hostage to Raiffeisen's debts. Thanks to Reich interest in takeover of the Preussenkasse, funding from the rka and the Reichsbank, and the Preussenkasse's inescapable financial commitment to Raiffeisen's fate, he could expect Semper to be forthcoming, even grateful. Having demonstrated federal support for his proposal, Braun effectively challenged the Preussenkasse's leading role in cooperative credit. In its final point, Braun's circular also indicated the rationale he was to employ to surmount opposition from the Reichsverband and the public purse to funds for Sanierung. 54 That rationale, sustained by equal measures of canny logic and semantic juggling, came crucially into play in three-way negotiations with the Reichsverband and rka in late 1927. Here the two cooperative organizations rehearsed the timeliness and benefits of rationalization and affirmed that the cooperatives could not achieve fusion with their own resources. Again the Reichsverband distinguished categorically between funds required for rationalization and those needed for Sanierung, and no less categorically refused to saddle agricultural cooperatives with the ''odium'' of the latter. It judged the proposed 150 million mark loan package as excessive for rationalization but inadequate for both rationalization and rescuing the Raiffeisen Bank. Its position saddled Raiffeisen with the odium of bad debts and spotlighted Braun's ploy of burying Raiffeisen's losses in the overall proposal. 55 Yet while strongly affirming the principle of self-help, the Reichsverband was to prove more flexible than its categorical statements suggested.
The rka countered Braun's financial proposal with an offer of four to five million marks annually over many years at a discounted interest rate to facilitate rationalization. It recognized Raiffeisen's losses but reconciled the difference between rationalization and Sanierung with the argument, almost certainly inspired by Braun, that it was not possible to separate costs for the former from what it called pre-liabilities (Vorbelastungen). Braun affirmed the Reichsverband's position that credit would go under the banner of rationalization rather than Sanierung, but immediately added that Sanierung would be included in the costs of rationalization. 56 In response to this curious doublespeak, a Reichsverband representative interjected, as though on cue, that the line between the two kinds of credit was fluid. The rka, noting the supportive position of the Reichsbank, assumed responsibility for approaching the Preussenkasse and the Reichstag to work out the terms on which credit would be forthcoming. 57
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For Semper's objections to Braun's approach see BArch R 8087/56, [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] BArch R 8087/64, 100-106. 56
In bilateral talks in May 1927 Braun cited Reichsverband losses to observe that a cooperative association able to borrow cheaply would surely be indifferent to whether the funds were labelled for Sanierung or rationalization: Ibid., 85-86. On personal approaches to the rka see BArch R 8087/66, BArch R 8087/64, 106.
thomas j. saunders
The stakes in this cagey performance from the cooperative delegations became apparent in their subsequent debriefing session. The Reichsverband representatives now retracted what they had just conceded, rejecting funds for Sanierung on the grounds that they would not be able to face their own organization if Raiffeisen received public money to recoup losses when they had adhered to the principle of self-help. Like the Preussenkasse, the Reichsverband did not want to be party to bailout of a mismanaged institution. Braun, with the assistance of his executive manager at the bank, August Schmidt, replied by elaborating the argument about pre-liabilities. Schmidt, who had recently published a major study of Germany in the world economy, 58 explained that his research showed there was a fluid line between costs associated with preparing a sector for rationalization and those incurred in the process of rationalization. Insofar as debts blocked rationalization they were pre-liabilities. 59 Braun's tactic for overcoming opposition to funds that would cover at least a part of Raiffeisen's losses was politically adroit and difficult to gainsay. For the Preussenkasse, as for the other public institutions in support of rationalization, there was as little gain in a merger that saddled a unified cooperative organization with substantial debt as in the Raiffeisen Bank 's collapse. The renaming of bad debts as pre-liabilities made sense economically and politically. For the Reichsverband, which made merger conditional on decentralization of credit operations, the obligations of the Raiffeisen Bank to the Preussenkasse needed in any case to be retired. 60 In addition, although not carrying a large central debt, the Reichsverband had incurred losses at the regional level. Raiffeisen's approach made room for inclusion of these pre-liabilities among the costs of rationalization, maximizing the claims that could be made on the public purse. 61
It recognized Raiffeisen's losses but reconciled the difference between rationalization and Sanierung with the argument, almost certainly inspired by Braun, that it was not possible to separate costs for the former from what it called pre-liabilities (Vorbelastungen). Braun affirmed the Reichsverband's position that credit would go under the banner of rationalization rather than Sanierung, but immediately added that Sanierung would be included in the costs of rationalization.
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Braun's tactical nous in making the case for recovery of bad debts proved itself when representatives of both cooperative organizations negotiated with the president of the Preussenkasse. Again the Reichsverband rejected credit for Sanierung in principle, though it conceded that distinguishing losses from costs of rationalization was difficult. But when Semper rejected Sanierung in favour of self-help, described the financial package as inflated, and proposed funding be distributed beyond the cooperative sector, the Reichsverband joined Raiffeisen in strong protest. With Braun, its representatives countered that further slicing of the public pie would short-change the cooperatives and jeopardize funds from the rka. 62 Shortly thereafter the Reichsverband adopted a resolution that Sanierung of indebted cooperatives should go hand in hand with rationalization. Without referring to the losses of the Raiffeisen Bank, it aligned its position with that of Raiffeisen. 63
VII.
With the Reichsverband on board, Braun once again had to convince his supervisory board and executive that merger was their preferred future. Another round of soul-searching about loss of independence and sacrifice of a unique heritage threatened to derail the talks, and with them the prospect of extensive state aid. Backed by Schmidt, Braun managed to move his colleagues beyond impassioned reflection on Raiffeisen's historical and spiritual identity to a resolution identifying the points on which clarity needed to be attained for merger. Foremost among these was whether the Reichsverband would insist, as part of cooperative self-help, that the share capital of the Raiffeisen Bank be sacrificed to cover a portion of the noncooperative losses. 64 Braun's internal victory coincided with a joint Raiffeisen/Reichsverband approach to the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture, Martin Schiele, for financial aid for rationalization. Schiele, already sympathetic in principle, subsequently included in the emergency agricultural aid program he presented to the Reichstag in February 1928 an urgent call for cooperative rationalization -elimination of organizational duplication and wastein language lifted from Braun's memorandum on the subject. He earmarked twenty-five million marks for credit assistance to rationalization as well as a further thirty million marks in emergency funding. These amounts were 62 BArch R 8087/64, 110-114. 63
Ibid., 118. The resolution recited the obligatory commitment to self-help before outside aid. 64
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thomas j. saundersin addition to an emergency bridging credit of 100 million marks to the deeply indebted Preussenkasse for distribution to needy cooperatives. The Reichstag, despite sharp divergence on how aid was to be distributed, broadly supported the initiative. 65 When the respective bargaining teams for Raiffeisen and the Reichsverband met in early 1928 they began to address concrete issues -Raiffeisen's precise financial status, how to establish the costs of merger, and where to begin. 66 From this point forward, negotiations focused on practical questions, though they still proceeded slowly. 67 The task for Braun was to manage internal differences and keep a brave face on the status of the bank so as not to spook cooperative members. He still walked a fine line between realism and resistant colleagues whom he mollified with expressions of confidence that the Raiffeisen Bank could pay its own way out of debt and survive. Until the modalities of merger were finalized, he had to pretend he was confident about the latter course: the alternative was panic among Raiffeisen's already uneasy or resentful members. Under these circumstances, in mid-1928 some of Raiffeisen's board members were still treating incremental repayment of the bank 's losses, i.e. self-help thanks to the bridging credit, as a practical alternative to cooperative union. 68 The future they preferred dovetailed with the fiction they maintained for public purposes.
Both illusion and fiction persisted until the late summer of 1928 when a decisive intervention by the new president of the Preussenkasse, Otto Klepper, precipitated a final internal crisis on the road to union. Klepper had been appointed by the Prussian government in January, against the recommendation of the cooperative representatives on the Preussenkasse's advisory board, to rescue the Preussenkasse from insolvency. For Raiffeisen, as for the broadly conservative agrarian sector in general, Klepper, though When the respective bargaining teams for Raiffeisen and the Reichsverband met in early 1928 they began to address concrete issues -Raiffeisen's precise financial status, how to establish the costs of merger, and where to begin.
formally non-partisan, represented the political ascendancy of left-wing critics of Semper's loan policies as extravagant and tilted toward large landowners. 69 He also brought a tone and independence from previous understandings that Raiffeisen found unsettling. When in early June he inquired whether the Raiffeisen Bank wanted to liquidate or pay off its debts, the reply was full commitment to the latter course. Relieved by having just come through their annual congress without further crisis or embarrassment, the leadership could still imagine an independent future. 70
Klepper's initiative of August 1928 reflected his dual commitment to set the Preussenkasse's finances in order and to assert the Preussenkasse's, and thus Prussia's, leadership in unifying the cooperative movement. 71 It abruptly eliminated the alternative of drawn-out amortization of the Raiffeisen Bank 's losses. In a lengthy memorandum that stunned and outraged Raiffeisen's board and executive, he dismissed business as usual as unworkable. By his reckoning the losses of the bank were continuing to grow and were minimally in the range of 60 to 66 million marks. Interest charges on this debt made it completely unrealistic to pay down principal as well as cover operating expenses. No more realistic was the expectation that the Preussenkasse, the principal creditor, would watch while the financial bleeding continued. 72 Klepper detailed an action plan as a set of stipulations, not recommendations. Effective immediately the Preussenkasse would appoint a representative, with veto power, to the executive of the Raiffeisen Bank. The bank 's losses would be addressed on the principle of self-help before outside aid would be provided: its share capital and potentially also the pledges for the bridging loan would first be set against its debts. Once the Raiffeisen associations met their financial obligations, fusion of cooperatives would proceed on the rule that the stronger of the two groups in each region would survive; the other would disappear. The Preussenkasse would assume the credit functions of the Raiffeisen Bank, so that as soon as the arrangements for addressing the losses and merging the cooperative associations were made, the bank would be dissolved. 73 If Klepper's challenge to comforting illusions was not enough to create upset, his terms provoked charges of betrayal. To Braun and his colleagues Klepper responded to their objections point-by-point and refused to be cowed by their predictions of irreparable damage to the cooperative movement. Inverting their argument, he noted that it would be severely damaging to the credibility of the Raiffeisen organization if cooperative merger were to be attained exclusively with public assistance. Invoking the principle of self-help, he noted that his proposal would require Raiffeisen to cover one-quarter to one-third of its losses; the public purse would shoulder the balance. He also tacitly accepted the logic of the ''fluid line'' between costs for rationalization and Sanierung, emphasizing that public funding would offset Raiffeisen's bad debts. Finally, he noted that the Preussenkasse, whose entire share capital was tied up in its commitments to the Raiffeisen Bank, had to borrow money at market rates and could not provide Raiffeisen discounted interest rates indefinitely. 76 Notwithstanding its indignation, Raiffeisen's leadership recognized Klepper's intervention as a well-informed and astute power play, a reassertion of the Preussenkasse's role in the cooperative sector. Klepper admitted as much. His goal was to be the linchpin in rationalization of the cooperative movement, to coordinate funding with the rka and the Reichsbank. 77 Strikingly, Raiffeisen made no attempt to refute his figures or financial conclusions: the affront came from the forcefulness of his stipulations. After debate about whether it was feasible to persist on the road to self-recovery, 74 Indignation found expression in Braun's analogy to Germany's betrayal in the hated Diktat of Versailles and suggestions that Raiffeisen should threaten to declare bankruptcy: BArch R 8087/101, 10. 75
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Raiffeisen's leadership decided to lobby parliamentarians and the Prussian Minister of Finance against the harshness of Klepper's terms. Ironically, their talking points -commitment to cooperative rationalization, dependence on funds from the Reich, rka and the Preussenkasse, the injustice and risks involved with sacrifice of the Raiffeisen Bank 's share capital, and the disrespect and damage associated with appointment of an outsider with veto power to the Raiffeisen Bank 's executive -were also a point of no return. With them Raiffeisen admitted the impossibility of retaining an independent organization. 78
In the short run Raiffeisen leaders reacted to Klepper as though he were the enemy, though they raised no objections to his willingness to assume responsibility for the lion's share of their debts. Feelings again ran high in a subsequent meeting where Klepper reiterated that the rescue plan approved by the Preussenkasse in 1926 was no longer viable. Two Raiffeisen representatives openly compared Klepper's approach to the betrayal of Versailles: he came not to negotiate but to dictate. As before, Klepper stood his ground. The meeting ended with the two sides agreeing to disagree. 79 However, beneath sharp differences lay a common goal. Furthermore, it was in both their interests to resolve these differences rather than engage in an extended standoff and jeopardize public funding available for cooperative rationalization. Over the next three months the main points of contention were settled. Raiffeisen agreed to cover 20 million marks of its losses from the share capital and reserves of the bank. Klepper agreed not to require the pledges for the bridging credit of 1926 but allow Raiffeisen to return these to its members. He also coordinated a public rescue package worth almost 50 million marks to cover the balance of Raiffeisen's losses. In addition, Klepper conceded that pressure from the Preussenkasse to unify the cooperative movement had created distrust. The process was to be negotiated rather than forced. Raiffeisen welcomed this shift in approach and acknowledged in turn that dissolution of the bank and cooperative fusion were necessary. 80
VIII.
The confrontation of autumn 1928 clarified Raiffeisen's future and facilitated a pragmatic approach to its losses. It also underscored the consensus that in moving toward merger every effort was to be made to avoid further 
IX.
If in the final stage of negotiations the initiative passed increasingly to the public bodies that would fund rationalization, the groundwork laid by Braun over the previous two years was important. Four overlapping points deserve mention. First, by championing the cause of rationalization Braun established a foundation for public aid that would appear less as rescue than as service to a greater, national cause. Second, by engaging the Reichsverband directly from the start, Raiffeisen cultivated a community of interests and understanding that facilitated joint appeals to the state. That community was admittedly characterized by suspicion, sharply competing interests and jockeying for influence, but for all that it proved functional for negotiating aid. Third, by taking the initiative Braun played a key role in establishing the terms, in both a general and a narrow sense, on which cooperative rationalization would be achieved. The contest over funds for Sanierung as opposed to rationalization had crucial ramifications, not only in discussions with the Reichsverband and financial authorities but also in later parliamentary debates, where Raiffeisen's position was eventually accepted. Fourth, by cultivating Reich authorities Braun broadened the base of financial support and helped galvanize the Preussenkasse to reassert its leading role, one that proved more favourable than Raiffeisen anticipated. Raiffeisen did ultimately surrender its bank and then its independence. However, given the calamitous investments of mid-decade, a negotiated merger, with debts heavily indemnified from the public purse, was strongly preferable to precipitous collapse and scandal. As Raiffeisen's general director, Braun made the best of ruinous circumstances. By transforming financial crisis into an opportunity that could be tied to economic efficiency and the public interest, by balancing between realism and the idealism of his own organization, and by bargaining with diverse partners, Braun salvaged what could be salvaged from the debacle he inherited in early 1926. At the time, allegations of malfeasance at the bank threatened to drag Raiffeisen into the spotlight along with other enterprises embroiled in scandal in the aftermath of the hyperinflation. By 1929, when the misguided loans belatedly became the subject of criminal charges and a parliamentary inquiry, the Raiffeisen Bank had been dissolved and the modalities and financing for cooperative merger were already in place. 85 Even had there been no threat of public scandal, there was substantial resentment among Raiffeisen cooperatives over losses at the bank and anxiety about the security of members' savings. It is testimony not least to Braun's skills as a strategist, communicator and negotiator that the organization contained the fallout and remained largely intact. 86
X.
What can we conclude from this case study about the relationship between self-help and state aid? As in research on cooperatives in the prewar period, it is clear that self-help and state aid were interdependent and complementary rather than alternatives. 87 For Raiffeisen, at least in crisis, self-help was a means as much as a foundational principle -a rationale for the uniqueness and benefits of the cooperative ideal, for internal solidarity in the wake of non-cooperative loans that failed, and for public support of cooperative merger. The pledges backing the bridging credit embodied each element of this rationale. With them Raiffeisen approached public institutions as its benefactors but also on the assumption that they had an obligation to assist. That obligation was closely tied to state commitment to agriculture and agricultural credit unions. It also rested on historical ties with the Preussenkasse and on that institution's inherent interest in Raiffeisen's wellbeing. In Braun's words to Carl Semper, the Preussenkasse's prestige rested on nothing other than the prosperity of ''its'' cooperatives. 88 Negotiations for state aid to facilitate cooperative merger and to absorb Raiffeisen's losses rested on this community of interests and an accompanying sense of cooperative entitlement. The state existed, as suggested above, to provide rescue and redress, even if it was otherwise to respect independence. 89 This is not, however, to argue that the outcome of negotiations was assured. Braun's previous interest in cooperative union, his sober assessment of Raiffeisen's predicament, and his cultivation of state authorities 85 Cf. Klein, Korruption und Korruptionsskandale, Decline in membership in this period could have assumed panic proportions, as Raiffeisen leaders recognized: BArch R 8087/100, 60. 87
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It is testimony not least to Braun's skills as a strategist, communicator and negotiator that the organization contained the fallout and remained largely intact.
who favoured consolidation of agricultural cooperatives positioned him to pursue rationalization as the key to whatever rescue Raiffeisen could expect. Rationalization offered a principle and a platform to which all negotiating parties -state and cooperative -could pay lip-service. Braun adopted and deployed it, though as his exchanges with Carl Semper and the rka over Sanierung indicate, he was far too subtle a negotiator to be trapped by language. He could cite Raiffeisen's spiritual and ethical heritage and the principle of self-help as benefits to the agricultural economy. 90 He could also cite rationalization, a shibboleth of his age, as grounds for merging agricultural cooperatives. His tactical trimming was no less effective for being transparent. Braun understood that spiritual values provided glue for the Raiffeisen organization, fostering a sense of identity, commitment and willingness for sacrifice. But he had no illusions that these could overcome the financial crisis of mid-decade. Since the Raiffeisen Bank embodied the financial future of the membership, Raiffeisen's leaders had a moral as well as a commercial obligation to do everything within their power to save what could be saved. For Braun, self-help and state aid were two sides of a coin. Recognizing the possibilities for state aid, he demonstrated remarkable agility in combining the mantras of rationalization and cooperative selfhelp, in professed service of the German agrarian economy, to make the crisis of the Raiffeisen Bank a matter deserving public aid. Rescue meant rationalization.
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